The relationship between risk and returns plays an important role in the asset pricing literature. It has long been recognized that both expected return and volatility change over time. Sophisticated econometric models such as GARCH have been developed to characterize the volatility behavior of asset returns. These models assume that conditional volatility of future returns depends on shocks in the current volatility or other state variables, while unconditional volatility is constant over time. It is therefore a surprise that in a recent paper by Campbell et al (2001) , the level of average stock return volatility is found to have been increasing over time from 1962 to 1997 in the U.S. Moreover, it is the idiosyncratic stock return volatility that has increased over time, while the volatility of the stock market returns remained basically unchanged. The latter …nding echoes another related work by Morck et al (2000) in which the rise of the ratio of idiosyncratic risk to systematic risk in the US stock markets is documented. That the average stock return volatility has been increasing has some profound implications for investors because, as Campbell et al (2001) point out, investors may not always be able to fully diversify their investment portfolios and increased idiosyncratic risks corrode the risk-reward relationship.
In order to understand better the causes and consequences of the increasing stock market volatility, a brief review of the larger literature on the so-called excessive volatility is worthwhile. Shiller (1981) argues that volatility in the stock market index is too high to be accounted for by the variation in subsequent dividends.
1 A similar phenomenon is also found in the bond market. Roll (1988) examines the relationship at the …rm level between corporate events and the stock returns immediately after the events and …nds a very low R 2 . The evidence seems to suggest that stock returns are unrelated to the changes in their fundamental values. There is a literature that documents a positive relationship between stock return volatility and trading volume. In a follow-up study to Campbell et al (2001) , Malkiel and Xu (2002) suggest that increased volatility has something to do with increased trading activities by …nancial institutions. The relationship between volatility and trading volume, however, does not directly answer the question of whether stock return volatility is explained by changes in the fundamental value.
From the observation that more developed markets tend to have a higher ratio of …rm-speci…c risk to total risk than emerging markets. Morck et al (2000) argue that the higher ratio actually indicates that more …rm-speci…c information is incorporated into stock prices. Given the di¢culty in verifying such a belief in face of the evidence in Roll (1988) , Durnev et al (2000 Durnev et al ( , 2001 turn to a …rm's characteristics and performance over a longer horizon. Their …ndings indirectly support the notion that a higher ratio of …rm-speci…c risk to total risk re ‡ects a higher informational e¢ciency in the stock market.
However, the question of why the absolute level of …rm-speci…c volatility increased over time remains to be answered.
In a more recent paper by Pastor and Veronesi (2002) , …rm characteristics including return volatility are analyzed in a rational asset pricing framework. Learning for profitability induces an age e¤ect, which implies that newly listed …rms tend to have higher return volatility. In this paper, we examine the causes of increasing volatility in stock returns empirically and, in particular, we try to answer two speci…c questions. The …rst question pertains to the extent to which the upward trend in the average return volatility can be attributed to the changes in the fundamentals of …rms. The second question pertains to the division of the upward trend in the average stock return volatility between existing stocks and newly listed stocks.
2
Perhaps no researcher would deny the role of fundamental variables in determining stock prices. The question often centers on whether the variation in stock prices is fully explained by changes in the fundamental variables. A growing literature on behavioral …nance emphasizes investors' irrational behavior as an additional explanation for the 2 Pastor and Veronesi (2002) also address the related issues. But their empirical analysis is on the cross-sectional relations, rather than on the upward trend in the average return volatility. variation in stock prices that is not explained by the fundamentals. Anecdotal evidence on fashions, fads and bubbles in the …nancial markets seems to support the view that, from time to time, stock prices are subject to errors. But even with the extreme view of ine¢cient markets, these errors are not totally random. They often take the form of underreaction or overreaction to the information in the fundamental variables. Therefore, understanding the e¤ect of fundamental variables on the stock return volatility is crucial to resolving the issue of excess volatility. For an upward trend in stock return volatility that lasted for about four decades, a thorough understanding of the impact from these fundamental variables is indispensable.
From the fundamentalist point of view, stock prices equal the sum of all the discounted future dividends. Indeed, Pastor and Veronesi (2002) document a strong crosssectional relationship between return volatility and dividend yield. But since dividends are under the discretion of corporate managers who normally set dividend payout ratios to meet their companies' long term growth needs and often iron out the wrinkles in corporate earnings to provide smooth dividend payments, as Lintner (1956) and Marsh and Merton (1986, 1987) point out, the time-series relationship between the return volatility and the dividend volatility may often be distorted. We, therefore, focus on earnings rather than on dividends. Although earnings can be manipulated by managers too to some extent, excessive manipulation is not without the risk of criminal investigation as recent events indicate. Earnings, therefore, re ‡ect more information about future profitability of the …rm than do dividends which are under complete legitimate discretion of the managers. A recent paper by Vuolteenaho (2002) points out that …rm-level stock returns are mainly driven by cash- ‡ow news. His …nding is also based on …rm-level earnings.
We …nd two variables that are useful in explaining the upward trend in the average stock return volatility, measured by variance. One is the average return-on-equity, which is the earnings divided by the book-value of equity. The other is the average sample variance of the return-on-equity in the past three years. Using the data from 1976 to 2000 in the US stock markets, we document that the equally weighted average returnon-equity declined while the equally weighted sample variance of return-on-equity rose.
These two factors explain most of the upward trend in the equally weighted return variances and all of the upward trend in the value-weighted return variances. This conclusion holds for the average variances of both raw returns and market-adjusted returns. The number of …rms in the sample period increased from around 2000 in 1976 to around 5000 in 2000. The contribution to the decline in the equally weighted average return-on-equity and the rise in the equally weighted average variance of return-on-equity mainly comes from newly listed stocks. We also explore other fundamental variables, such as …rm size and leverage, for their role in explaining the upward trend in return volatility. Although these variables themselves have cross-sectional explanatory power for return volatility at the …rm level, the averages of these variables do not have visible trends over time and are not responsible for the upward trend in return volatility.
The second question we try to answer in this paper regards how the increased average return volatility is divided between existing …rms and newly listed …rms. From the beginning to the end of the sample period we analyze, the number of stocks has more than doubled. Many newly listed …rms tend to have higher growth potentials and higher return volatilities that contribute to the higher average return volatility. A quantitative measure that separates the two sources of the increased average volatility can help us understand better the nature of the increase. We …nd that of the upward trend in the equally weighted average variance of returns, about one-third is attributed to existing …rms and about two-thirds is attributed to newly listed …rms. For the value-weighted average variance of returns, the division is roughly half and half.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data we use in this study and presents simple statistics on the average return variances, average returnon-equity, and average sample variance of return-on-equity. Some preliminary analysis is also provided. Section 2 establishes relationships between return variance and the two explanatory variables at the …rm level in cross-sectional regressions. Section 3 then presents the main results that the two fundamental variables explain most of the upward trend in the average return variances. The last section concludes the paper.
Data and Preliminary Analysis A. The Sample
The data we use in this paper are from the Center for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago and Compustat. CRSP has daily return data from 1962 to 2000. Compustat has quarterly accounting data from 1971 to 2000. A stock is included if it has daily stock return data in a particular month, and quarterly earnings for the past three years. The past earnings are used to calculate the sample variance of the return-on-equity, which is the earnings divided by the book-value of equity. Only stocks with positive book-value of equity are included in the sample. The sample period we choose is from January 1976 to December 2000.
In order to see how return volatility changes over time, we divide the entire sample period of 1976-2000 into several subperiods of …ve years. Panel A of Table I lists the average numbers of …rms in the various subperiods. The number of …rms varies from month to month, but on average there are 2150.25 …rms in 1976-1980, 2161.62 …rms in 1976-1985 , and so on. The average number of …rms increases over time. The increase is slow initially, but accelerates quickly. In the last …ve-year subperiod, there are a total of 4862.27 …rms in the sample. where i stands for a stock and t a month, is de…ned as the sample variance of daily raw returns within the month, multiplied by the number of trading days in the month. The variance of market-adjusted returns, denoted as VR adj it , is de…ned as the sample variance of daily returns on stock i in excess of the daily return on the value-weighted market portfolio, multiplied by the number of trading days in the month. The value-weighted market portfolio here is calculated using stocks in the sample.
In each month, t, we denote the equally weighted and value-weighted cross-sectional average variances of raw returns as VR raw ew;t and VR raw vw;t , where value is the market capitalization of stock i in the beginning of month t. We also calculate the variance of marketadjusted returns. The monthly variance of market-adjusted returns, VR adj it , is de…ned the same as that for raw returns except the daily raw returns are replaced by the di¤erence between the raw returns on stock i and the value-weighted average market returns. The equally weighted and value-weighted average variances are then denoted as VR adj ew;t and VR adj vw;t . As Campbell et al (2001) show, when the sample includes all the stocks in the market portfolio, the value-weighted average variance of the market-adjusted returns, VR adj vw;t , is the same as the value weighted average variance of the idiosyncratic returns. The equally weighted average variance of the market-adjusted returns, VR adj ew;t , does not have the same interpretation, but it nevertheless provides important information. We follow Campbell et al (2001) in using the market-adjusted return, rather than estimating the betas and calculating the idiosyncratic returns because a constant-beta market model does not describe the data very well.
For a given subperiod, the simple time-series average of the average variances is calculated across all the months in the subperiod and is reported in Panel B of Table I. For easy comparison, the reported monthly variances are multiplied by 1200 as Campbell et al (2001) did. From these simple averages, we make three observations on the return volatility. First, the equally weighted average variance of the raw returns in 1996-2000 is around 60, more than triple that of 18.82 in 1976-1980 . Second, the value-weighted average increases to 19.49 in 1996 19.49 in -2000 19.49 in , almost triple that of 6.75 in 1976 19.49 in -1980 various subperiods, the equally weighted average variances are about two to seven times as large as the value-weighted average variances, indicating that the stocks of smaller …rms are typically more volatile. We also notice that the trends in return volatility are not monotonic. The 1987 stock market crash obviously plays a role in the nonmonotonicity.
The fact that both equally weighted and value-weighted average variances of returns for 1996-2000 are triple those for 1976 -1980 recon…rms what Campbell et al 's (2000 …nding that the trend in return volatility is not caused only by stocks from small …rms.
There is a di¤erence, however, between equally weighted and value-weighted averages of 
C. Incremental Variance of Returns
Since the number of stocks increases over the sample period, the average variance of returns at di¤erent times is calculated over di¤erent samples of stocks. An upward trend in the average variance of returns can be caused by an increase in return volatility of existing stocks and by a higher return volatility of newly listed stocks.
3 One of the important questions we try to answer in this paper is how much the increase of the average return volatility is attributed to an increase of return volatility of existing …rms and how much to a higher return volatility of newly listed …rms.
For a given point in time, existing …rms consist of …rms that will survive in the future and …rms that will exit later. The average return variance for surviving …rms obviously has a survivorship bias that is not easy to correct. This is true because the contribution to the average return volatility made by …rms that eventually exit tend to be increasing over time before they exit and zero afterwards, so the net e¤ect of including these …rms in calculating time-series average variances is ambiguous. In this subsection, we consider the use of incremental variances of returns.
For a stock i in month t, the incremental variances of raw returns is de…ned by
where VR raw is is an estimate of the initial return variance, calculated as the simple average of return variances in the …rst twelve months in the sample in which the return, the return-on-equity and sample variance of the return-on-equity are available. 4 The initial return variance of a …rm that exits in the beginning of 1976 is taken as that of 1976.
We require that the stock have at least twenty-four months of data, so the sample of stocks is slightly smaller than before. The equally weighted and value-weighted averages of incremental variances of raw returns are denoted as IVR 
D. Graphical Analysis of Variance of Returns
The patterns presented in Table I can be illustrated graphically. Figure 
E. Return-on-equity (ROE) and Its Sample Variance (VROE)
Return-on-equity, ROE it , for stock i in month t is the stock's most recent quarterly earnings divided by the book value of equity. We use the (quarterly) earnings report date in Compustat to determine when the accounting information is available. It is typically available within three months after the end of a …rm's …scal quarter.
Most observations of ROE fall in the interval of (-0.5, 0.5). However, there are some extreme values that lie outside the interval. To avoid spurious inferences from these extreme values, we winsorize the observations at -0.5 and 0.5. Out of 613337 stockmonth observations, there are 3945 stock-months, or 0.6432%, with an ROE greater than 0.5, and there are 16351 stock-months, or 2.6659% with an ROE less than -0.5. The equally weighted and value-weighted average ROEs are denoted ROE ew;t and ROE vw;t .
Panel A of Table II The variance in return-on-equity used in this study, VROE it , for stock i and month t is the sample variance of quarterly ROEs over the last three years. The equally weighted and value-weighted average VROEs in month t are denoted as VROE ew;t and VROE vw;t , respectively. The time series means of VROE ew;t and VROE vw;t in various subperiods of 1976-2000 are also reported in Panel A of Table II . As average ROEs, the numbers for VROEs are also multiplied by 400. From the table, we see that the variance in return-on-equity has increased over time on average. The equally weighted averages of VROE are greater than the value-weighted averages, indicating that small …rms tend to have larger variances in ROE.
F. Incremental ROE and Incremental VROE
The incremental ROE and VROE for stock i and month t are de…ned similarly where the initial ROE is calculated as the simple average of ROEs in the …rst twelve months of the sample when returns, ROEs and VROEs are all available. For month t, the equally weighted and value-weighted average incremental ROEs are respectively denoted as IROE ew;t and IROE vw;t . The equally weighted and value-weighted averages of incremental VROEs are respectively denoted as IVROE ew;t and IVROE vw;t . The descriptive statistics for IROE and IVROE are reported in Panel B of Table II 
G. Graphical Analysis of ROE and VROE

Cross-sectional Regression Results
The preliminary analysis in the last section has shown that, as the average variance of stock returns increases over time, the average return-on-equity declines and the average variance of return-on-equity goes up. In the next section, we will consider this relationship in a time-series analysis. In order to demonstrate that the time-series relationship is not a spurious one, we perform cross-sectional analysis …rst in this section. In particular, we demonstrate that the cross-sectional relationship between the return volatility and the two fundamental variables is a robust one. It is important to note that our purpose here is to show that ROE and VROE indeed explain return volatility, but we do not argue here that they are the only variables that can explain return volatility. Quintile 1 is the lowest, and that for Quintile 3 is in the middle. The relationship is much clearer than that between the return variance and return-on-equity.
We now turn to the cross-sectional regression analysis of the variances of returns.
The variance of raw returns will be dealt with …rst. For each month t in the 1976-2000 period, we estimate coe¢cients with the following regression,
The estimated coe¢cients for all the months are then averaged over time to obtain the …nal estimate of the parameter as in standard cross-sectional regressions. Since return volatility is autocorrelated and heteroskedastic, the monthly estimates inherit these statistic properties too. The t-ratios reported in the parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation and conditional heteroskedasticity. We also run regressions using ROE it or VROE it alone. The results for each …ve-year subperiod as well as for the entire sample period of 1976-2000 are reported in Panel A of Table III . 
B. Cross-sectional Analysis of Incremental Variance of Returns
To associate return volatility with return-on-equity and its variance more closely, we run the cross-sectional regression of IVR on IROE and IVROE at the …rm level,
where IVR it is for either the raw returns or the market-adjusted returns. The estimated coe¢cients for all the months are then averaged over time and t-statistics are calculated as before. The results are reported in Table IV . Table IV here As we can see in Table IV , incremental return volatility is also negatively related to incremental return-on-equity and positively related to incremental variance of return-on-equity. The slope coe¢cients are signi…cant at conventional signi…cance levels in the entire sample period and in all the subperiods. As expected, however, the t-ratios and R 2 s for all of the regressions with the incremental variables are smaller than those in Table III . Since return volatility is not exclusively caused by return-on-equity and its variance, incremental return volatility is explained less by incremental return-on-equity and its variance.
Trend Analysis A. Time-series Analysis of Variance of Returns
Having established the cross-sectional relations of return variances with the two …rm-speci…c variables, return-on-equity and its variance, we now turn to the main issue of the upward trend in the averages of the return variances. Since, over the period of 1976-2000, the average return-on-equity declined, and the variance of return-on-equity increased substantially, the trend in these two variables may have contributed to the increase in the average return volatility. To establish such a link, we run regressions of the following type,
where VR t , ROE t and VROE t are either all value-weighted or all equally weighted. In addition, VR t can be either the average variance of raw returns or of market-adjusted returns. Of three explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation, combinations of them are used to separate their contributions in explaining the variation in the average return variance over time. The results are reported in Table V.   Table V here Panel A is for VR raw ew;t . The …rst regression uses the time trend only as the explanatory variable. The slope coe¢cient, when multiplied by 100,000, is 16.4831 with an OLS t-ratio of 18.8173 given in parentheses. As we noted earlier, the regression error terms are likely to be autocorrelated with conditional heteroskedasticity. The number in the bracket below the OLS t-ratio is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)-based t-ratio that uses the Newey-West type of adjustment for autocorrelation and conditional heteroskedasticity. The GMM-adjusted t-ratio reduces to 10.5282. The regression result adds to the evidence presented in Table I by giving an estimate of the monthly increment in the equally weighted average variance of returns. The monthly increment in return volatility is signi…cantly greater than zero and greater than that reported by Campbell et al (2000) due to the extremely high return volatility in the last few years not covered by their study.
The next three regressions look at how the equally weighted average ROE and the equally weighted average VROE contribute to explaining the equally weighted average variance of returns. When time and ROE ew;t are used to explain the variation in VR raw ew;t , the slope coe¢cient of ROE ew;t , µ 2 , is negative and signi…cant, as we have seen in the cross-sectional regressions. The coe¢cient for the time trend is about halved at 7.8422 with the OLS t-ratio and GMM t-ratio reduced by more than 3/4 and 2/3, respectively.
Although the trend coe¢cient is still signi…cantly greater than zero, it is obvious that about half of the upward trend in the equally weighted average variance of returns is explained by the downward trend in the equally weighted average ROE. The regression using time and VROE ew;t tells a similar story. The slope coe¢cient of VROE ew;t is positive and signi…cant, as in the cross-sectional regressions. That helps reduce the trend coe¢cient µ 1 by about half and the t-ratios by more than half. When both ROE ew;t and VROE ew;t are used to explain the return variance, their signi…cance is reduced compared with the cases when they are used individually because the two variables are correlated.
The trend coe¢cient, µ 1 , is about a quarter of its original value and both the OLS t-ratio and the GMM t-ratio indicate that the trend coe¢cient is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The evidence here shows that most of the upward trend in the equally weighted average variance of returns can be explained by the downward trend in the equally weighted average return-on-equity and the upward trend in the equally weighted average variance of return-on-equity.
The results for the equally weighted average variances of market-adjusted returns are presented in Panel B. The results are qualitatively the same as those for raw returns. Adding ROE ew;t and VROE ew;t to the regression substantially reduces the trend coe¢cient, µ 1 , of the return variance and render it insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero. Table V reports the results for value-weighted averages. We know from Table I that, although the value-weighted average variance in 1996-2000 is about three times that in 1976-1980, the major increase occurs in the 1996-2000 period. This is re ‡ected in the estimation of the trend coe¢cient that treats each month in the sample period equally. The trend coe¢cient is only 3.7154 per month when multiplied by 100,000, less than a quarter of the magnitude of the equally weighted average. When ROE vw;t is added to the regression, the trend coe¢cient (multiplied by 100,000) is reduced to 2.4901. A seeming puzzle is that the slope coe¢cient of ROE vw;t is positive, opposite to those in cross-sectional regressions and in the regression with ROE ew;t . One explanation for this will be provided later. The regression using time and VROE vw;t as explanatory variables has a striking result. The estimated slope coe¢cient of VROE vw;t is large and strongly signi…cant. The increment in R 2 is also very large. The presence of VROE vw;t makes the trend coe¢cient signi…cantly negative. That means, after controlling the level of VROE vw;t , the value-weighted average variance of returns actually declines over time. The estimated slope coe¢cient of ROE vw;t in the regression using time, ROE vw;t and VROE vw;t as explanatory variables is insigni…cant, though still positive. This gives a clue to why, in the regression using time and ROE vw;t as explanatory variables, the coe¢cient of ROE vw;t is signi…cantly positive. Unlike the correlation between the detrended ROE ew;t and the detrended VROE ew;t , which is negative, the correlation between the detrended ROE vw;t and the detrended VROE vw;t is positive.
Panel C of
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The positive slope coe¢cient of ROE vw;t is carried over from the positive coe¢cient of VROE vw;t , which is strong but missing from the regression. In Panel D, the regressions of the value-weighted average of the market-adjusted returns have very similar results as those of the raw returns. VROE vw;t plays a major role in explaining the trend in the return variance and makes the estimate of the trend coe¢cient negative.
B. Time-series Analysis of Incremental Variance of Returns
From Figure 1 , we know that the equally weighted average of the incremental variance of returns is near zero for the …rst half of the sample and is mostly positive in the second half of the sample. An upward trend can still be drawn that re ‡ects the increase in the return volatility for existing …rms. How this increase can be explained by the changes in the average ROE and average VROE is the subject of this subsection. Table VI presents the results of the regressions of the form
where IVR t , IROE t and IVROE t are either all value-weighted or all equally weighted.
In addition, IVR t can be either the average variance of the raw returns or of the marketadjusted returns. 
C. Discussion
We have demonstrated that the upward trend of the average return volatility of stocks is strongly associated with changes in fundamentals. We show that two fundamental variables, ROE and VROE, have changed dramatically over our sample period and have caused stock returns to be more volatile over time. Fundamental variables other than the two we tried in this paper may also have e¤ects on the cross-sectional distribution of the return volatility. These variables include the …rm-level …nancial leverage, the …rm size, and so on. However, we do not …nd signi…cant relationships between the average stock return volatility and the average leverage or the average …rm size in the time-series.
Our …ndings are consistent with the remarks by Campbell et al (2001) that …nancial leverage is not the cause of the upward trend in the average stock return volatility and by Schwert (1989) that aggregate leverage is not responsible for the extremely high return volatility in the 1929-1933 Great Depression.
Why the fundamentals change over time is beyond the scope of this paper. The following is a brief discussion of our results in relation to the recent literature. Fama and French (2001) study the earnings for newly listed stocks. They point out that "there is a change in the market for new lists around 1980, allowing …rms to list earlier in their life cycles, when they are smaller, growing rapidly, but still relatively unpro…table."
In particular, they …nd that after 1981, newly listed …rms become progressively less pro…table and the newly listed …rms that survive remain less pro…table than all listed …rms. What we show in this paper is that the return volatility of the newly listed stocks is the main culprit for the increasing average return volatility for all …rms. Schwert (2001) analyzes the return volatility for NASDAQ stocks in about the same sample period as we have and pays special attention on the last few years of the sample. His …nding that many NASDAQ …rms located in high-tech industries with growth options explains why these …rms have higher earnings volatility and hence higher return volatility. The analytical and empirical results in Pastor and Veronesi (2002) 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we address the issue of increasing average volatility in stock returns, previously documented by Campbell et al (2001) and Morck et al (2000) . We …nd that two variables, the average return-on-equity and the average sample variance of the return-onequity are useful in explaining the upward trend in the average stock return variances.
Over the period of 1976-2000, the average return-on-equity declined while the average sample variance of return-on-equity increased. The upward trend in the averages of return variance is mostly explained by the two variables. This is true for both variances of raw returns and market-adjusted returns. These two variables are also signi…cantly related to the return variance in cross-section at the …rm level.
We explore the sources of increasing stock return volatility. The components of the stock market change over time; some …rms exit from the stock market while some more enter. It is interesting to know whether the average stock return volatility increases mainly because the volatility of each stock rises on average, or because newcomers tend to have higher volatility. Our conclusion is that the latter is the main reason for the increasing average return volatility and the cause of it is the worsening pro…tability of the newly listed …rms. While existing …rms, especially the smaller ones, also exhibit an upward trend in return volatility, the pattern is less clear and the magnitude is small.
The contribution of the results obtained in this paper can be evaluated from the perspective of the larger literature on the so-called excess volatility of stock returns.
Opinions about high return volatility can be roughly classi…ed into three strands. The …rst group argues that high return volatility is excessive in the sense that the return volatility is too high to be explained by the changes in the fundamental variables. Shiller (1981) is representative of this view. The second group believes that stock return volatility is caused by changes in the fundamental variables and high volatility is undesirable.
This has been the mainstream view in asset pricing studies. The third group posits that stock return volatility is caused by changes in fundamental variables, but regards a higher ratio of the …rm-speci…c volatility to the volatility in the market portfolio as a desirable property, indicating more …rm-speci…c information is captured by stock prices.
The evidence presented in this paper lends support to the second view mentioned above. The upward trend in the average stock return volatility is found to be mainly The main message from this paper is that the upward trend in the average return volatility is caused by changes in the fundamental variables, but we say little about whether there is or is not excessive volatility in individual return volatilities. While return volatility at the …rm level is strongly related to earnings and earnings volatility cross-sectionally, it is far from being fully explained by these two variables.
The increased average return volatility in the period 1976-2000 is mainly attributed to the declining earnings and rising earnings volatility, so this increase in return volatility is undesirable based on this evidence. Whether stock prices have become more informative is not tested here directly, so we do not interpret the evidence here as opposite to the argument presented by Morck et al (2000) . However, since the increased return volatility mainly comes from newly listed …rms and existing large …rms do not experience signi…cant increases in return volatility, the information-based theory is perhaps not the most important explanation of why individual stocks became more volatile. 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996- 1976 -1980 1981 -1985 1986 -1990 1991 -1995 1996 -2000 1976 -1980 1981 -1985 1986 -1990 1991 -1995 1996 -2000 
where VR it is either for the raw returns or the market-adjusted returns. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios with conditional heteroskedasticity and three-month lag autocorrelation adjustments. The reported R 2 is the time-series average of the R 2 s in monthly regressions.
A: Variance of raw returns, VR 
A: Incremental variance of raw returns, IVR 
